Gaddaffi is Dead! Now what?

The 42-year reign of power and terror of Muammar Gaddafi/Kaddafi  came to an end yesterday with the fall of Sirte and his death. It is unclear at this point whether he died from wounds received in his capture or was executed afterwards. Here is a link with an embedded video purporting to be the confession of a Libyan rebel who executed him.  It makes little real difference. Gaddafi (I'm seen probably a dozen different spellings of his name in English) was one of the world's longest-serving heads of state. His reign goes back to the Nasserist era when pan-Arabism was king in the Arab world and military dictators were all the rage. His fall is also the biggest victory of the Arab Spring (or al-intifada al-Arabiya or al-thawra al-Arabiya if you prefer) to date. Previously the heads of state had changed in Egypt and Tunisia, but at least in the former the military regime remains in place.

For months now the Syrian opposition has been calling for the West to double-down and mount a military offensive against the Ba'athist Assad regime as it had aided the rebels in Libya. But this was not on the cards for two reasons. First, Italy was threatened with an influx of illegal immigrants from Libya if Gaddafi remained in power. Second, Gaddafi had created scores to be settled by many Western governments by his indiscriminate use of terrorism. Whereas Assad pere and Assad fils believed in the discriminate use of terrorism against their regime's most dangerous enemies at home and in occupied Lebanon. Damascus carried out no Lockerbies, Gaddafi carried out at least two--against the U.S. in December 1988 and against France in Septermber 1989. He also supported the IRA for decades--he was the Provisional IRA's only governmental supporter abroad. This contributed to hundreds of deaths in Northern Ireland and Britain from the tons of Semtex explosive and the hundreds of assault rifles that he exported to Northern Ireland in the mid-1980s. Thus, at least four governments felt that they had an incentive to get rid of him when the opportunity arose. Such is not the case with the Assad regime, or with any other regime in the Arab world at the moment.  See this discussion with George H.W. Bush official Richard Haass on why Libya isn't a precedent.

Gaddafi was always the leader of a weak, thinly -populated country that was not a major player in inter-Arab affairs. Rather than use his oil wealth to improve the lot of his population, he used it mainly to play at enhancing his influence in Africa and the Middle East by supporting rebel movements and rulers in neighboring countries. President Idi Amin Dada of Uganda was an early recipient of such aid when Gaddafi sent troops to fight alongside Uganda's against invading Tanzanian troops in 1979. But the Libyan soldiers performed rather poorly. In the 1980s he was preoccupied with influencing politics in neighboring Chad, one of the poorest countries in Africa, as well as supporting the Abu Nidal organization, a terrorist organization that broke from Fatah and specialized in assassinating any Palestinian who spoke of peace with Israel. This was after Abu Nidal had left Iraq and then Syria. Gaddafi liked to sound more Palestinian than the Palestinians, rejecting any prospects of peace with Israel. But Israel never really bothered with him because he was never considered a serious threat--certainly much less of a threat than the Palestinian rejectionist terror organizations, Iraq, and Syria. Here is a link to an article that attempts to explain Gaddafi's eccentric behavior.

The Western press always treated him as a buffoon rather than as a serious figure. But this disguised that he had much in common with his fellow Arab dictators like Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak in Egypt,  Hafiz and Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Like these other dictators he either took power in a coup or inherited it from a predecessor who had taken power in a coup--Gaddafi carried out his when Libya's King Idris was outside the country undergoing an operation. He spoke of power deriving from the people but maintained a ruthless security apparatus. He was a Soviet client until Moscow could no longer supply his needs. And most of his oil wealth was used to create a large military and thus appease the supporters who put him in the palace and might be tempted to replace him.

I predict that the Arab Spring will now go into hibernation while the "new" regimes in Egypt and Tunisia attempt to consolidate themselves through elections and while the new Libyan regime attempts to reconstruct and repair the damage from the war against the dictator.

Who is Next?

Now that the pundits have seen the writing on the wall indicating that Mubarak's days are numbered, and we've seen the hundreds of thousands of fingers doing the writing, who will be the next Arab autocrat to go?

To begin to examine that question intelligently, we must first examine the nature of the regimes in the Arab world. Broadly speaking Arab regimes can be divided into two categories--monarchies (kingdoms, emirates) and military dictatorships. The former can then be further divided into the Gulf States with their oil wealth and the monarchies that lack this--Morocco, Jordan and Oman. The military dictatorships can be divided into two groups: the hereditary republics and the ordinary dictatorships. While there is quite a bit of difference between the Gulf States on one hand and the traditional military dictatorships on the other, there is little effective difference between the non-oil monarchies and the hereditary republics. Both types are repressive and both types suffer from serious economic problems. And members of both groups are aligned with Western powers such as France and the United States.

There have been four Arab countries that fit the description of hereditary republic.(North Korea is the only non-Arab country in this category that comes to mind, which should tell everyone something about the Arab world.)  These are/were: Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Libya. Only in Syria has the first despot been able to transfer the imaginary crown to the head of his son and heir. This is not because Hafiz al-Assad was necessarily wiser than Kaddafi, Mubarak, and Saddam Hussein, but merely because he died first. None of the others wants to transfer power while they are still capable of ruling. Saddam Hussein and his sons are now dead. The senior dictator sentenced to death and hanged by the Shi'ites that he once persecuted; the dictators apparent, Udai and Qusay, killed by American troops that discovered their safe house. It is now too late for Hosni Mubarak to transfer power to his son Gamal. It is still possible that Muammar Kaddafi might yet transfer power to his son Saif--apparently the sole son who doesn't have a reputation as a playboy.

In the Arab world the secret to remaining in power is to buy off the potential classes that could cause problems, retain the confidence of the military, and either buy off, exile or murder any serious potential threats within the regime. The Gulf States buy off the population and especially the middle class with generous education benefits and make-work jobs. These are funded from oil revenues. The clergy is then bought off by funding Wahhabite missionary activities throughout the region and the Arab diaspora in Europe and the United States. The military dictatorships that are aligned with the U.S. use American aid to subsidize heating oil, food, and other basic staples for the lower classes. Formerly the Soviet Union also provided this function for its regional allies, but it is gone. This has forced Damascus to turn to Tehran for an alliance.

Potentially the two countries most immediately in danger are Yemen, which has already experienced political unrest following the fall of the regime in Tunis, and Syria. Syria has not experienced unrest yet and is trying to preempt it with new reforms that have been announced. Bashar al-Assad feels that unlike Mubarak he can breathe easier as he is on the right side of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not having signed a peace treaty with Israel. That is why the hope of getting Assad to switch alliances in order to make peace with Israel is probably a pipe dream--he needs the conflict in order to legitimize his heretical Alawite regime (the Alawis are an offshoot of the Shia).

Jordan is also at risk as well over 60 percent of the country's population is made up of Palestinians--those who fled in 1948 and 1967 and their descendants. Jordan's King Abdullah II inherited from his father, King Hussein, the knowledge of how to periodically change prime ministers while running a show parliament and a facade of democracy. He has just put in place a "new" prime minister--who has ruled before. He, like the king, is a former major general in the army. The security of the regime rests on the army and secret police, which are both manned mostly by Jordanians of Beduin extraction from either Jordan or originally from the Red Sea coast of Arabia. The Hashemite monarchs claim legitimacy as direct descendants of Muhammad. But the king's biggest asset is a light ruling hand and good economic management over the decades that he inherited from his father.

The ruling house in Morocco could also potentially be at risk as there are tensions between the Arabs and Berbers in the country and it is rather poor. Europe is an escape valve for many poor Arabs throughout North Africa. Libya, located between Tunisia and Egypt, is also at risk. Muammar Kaddafi has been in power since 1969--41 years. He should either begin transferring power to his son or be prepared for political unrest.

Lebanon is sui generis. It is neither a monarchy nor a military dictatorship but a collection of mutually hostile sectarian groups of Christians and Muslims. It is sitting on a powder keg because of the UN investigation of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005.  Hezbollah, which maintains a large private militia in defiance of an agreement by all the political parties to disarm following the fifteen-year civil war, has threatened that it will regard anyone who supports the UN tribunal as an enemy. Its enemies usually experience premature deaths. Syria and Iran both back Hezbollah--it served both as a pressure on Israel and a client militia for the former and was trained by the latter. So far Shi'ite Lebanon is the most successful example of the export of Iranian revolution. Its powder keg has a fuse that is independent of the regional unrest, but could be sped up if Syria experiences significant unrest.